Crossing the Judicial Border: Access to Judicial
Review for a Premature Appeal of an Order for
Removal
Evelyn Rodriguez*
I.

Introduction ....................................................................... 186

II. Background And Development Of Judicial Review Under
The Immigration And Nationality Act.................................... 189
A. Appeal Procedure........................................................... 190
B. Meaning of “Finality” in the INA ................................. 191
III. Circuit Split ........................................................................ 193
A. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May
Ripen for Purposes of Judicial Review ............................... 194
i.

Second Circuit ............................................................ 194

ii. Third Circuit ............................................................... 195
iii. Tenth Circuit .............................................................. 197
iv. Eleventh Circuit.......................................................... 197
B. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May
Not Ripen for Judicial Review ............................................. 199
i.

Fifth Circuit ................................................................ 199

ii. Sixth Circuit ................................................................ 200
iii. Ninth Circuit ............................................................... 201

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., 2014, Rutgers
University, English and Political Science. I would like to thank Professor Farrin Anello
for her guidance and insight during the writing process. This Comment is dedicated to my
family for their unconditional love and support.

185

186

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:185

IV. THE INA’S AMBIGUOUS JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROVISIONS CREATE CONFUSION ................................. 202
V. Proposal For Expanding Judicial Review In Immigration
204
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................... 207

I.

INTRODUCTION

To what extent can Congress deprive noncitizens of access to judicial
review to challenge government actions that harm them?
To avoid removal from the United States, a noncitizen, who is
typically unrepresented and lacks understanding of our immigration laws
is required to go through a rigorous administrative process before a federal
judge will review his case and ultimately decide his fate. The stakes are
especially high for noncitizens who escaped violence in their homelands.
Often, due to the lack of guidance from Congress and the federal courts,
noncitizens are deprived of their right to seek federal judicial review and
are ultimately removed to unsafe countries.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),1 provides the basic
framework for current U.S. immigration law. The INA covers
immigration quotas, entry, exclusion, deportation proceedings, visa
issuance and inspection, and the legal relief available to those facing
deportation.2 Under the INA, noncitizens3 may petition for judicial
review4 of an adverse decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board” or “BIA”) as long as that decision constitutes a final order of
removal.5 But nowhere in the INA is the relevant phrase “final order of
removal” clearly defined.6 Instead, “terminology concerning finality is
1 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.).
2 Richard D. Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 1:2 (2014).
3 The INA defines the term “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). For simplicity and to advance social equality, the
non-derogatory term “noncitizen” will be used throughout this Comment.
4 The principal vehicle for judicial review is a “petition for review,” which must be
filed in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (a)(5). However, there are also restrictions on judicial
review for people removable on criminal grounds. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by
reason of having committed a criminal offense . . . .”).
6 The courts have linked the term “order of removal” to the INA’s definition of a final
order of deportation. Thus, an “order of removal” refers to the administrative order
concluding that the noncitizen is removable or ordering removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(A).
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spread throughout both the statute and regulations, leaving ample room for
courts to construct their own views on whether or when certain Board
decisions become final for purposes of judicial review.”7
As to the existence of an “order,” the INA provides that immigration
judges will decide cases and, if necessary, order removal at the conclusion
of the proceedings.8 The regulation defines the “order of the immigration
judge” as one that “direct[s] the respondent’s removal from the United
States, or the termination of the proceedings, or other such disposition of
the case.”9 As the Board has observed, “the regulations contemplate that
an Immigration Judge will enter an order that leads to a final conclusion
of the removal proceedings.”10 Once there is an order of removal, the INA
provides two conditions upon which the order becomes final: (1) when the
Board affirms it; or (2) when the time to appeal the order to the Board
expires.11
After the order by the immigration judge becomes final, the
noncitizen may file a petition for review with the court of appeals for their
geographic location.12 On petition for review, “whether from the
immigration judge’s or the Board’s decision, the other requirements of 8
U.S.C. § 1252 must be met, including the timely filing of the petition for
review from the final order of removal and the noncitizen’s exhaustion of
all administrative remedies.”13 Generally, the thirty-day statutory filing
deadline to obtain judicial review by the court of appeals begins to run
when the Board issues a decision that affirms the immigration judge’s
removal order in its entirety.14 In some cases, however, noncitizens seek
multiple forms of relief from removal in a single proceeding, leading to
confusion regarding finality. In such a case, the Board may uphold part of

7 Jesi J. Carlson et al., Finality and Judicial Review Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act: A Jurisprudential Review and Proposal for Reform, 49 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 635, 637 (2016).
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
9 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c).
10 In re I-S-& C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 433 (B.I.A. 2008) (“Since the regulations
require entry of an order that will result in the conclusion of proceedings, a grant of
voluntary departure without an alternate order of deportation is improper because it leaves
the proceedings unresolved and incomplete” (citing In re Chamizo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 435
(B.I.A. 1969); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)).
11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
12 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1).
13 Jesi J. Carlson et al., Finality and Judicial Review Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act: A Jurisprudential Review and Proposal for Reform, 49 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 635, 650 (2016) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(1), 1252 (d)(1)).
14 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(b)(1).

188

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:185

a removal order but remand to the immigration judge for further
proceedings.15
For instance, in Singh v. Lynch, the BIA denied the noncitizen’s
asylum request, but remanded his case to an immigration judge for further
proceedings.16 Singh waited until post-remand proceedings were
complete before timely filing a petition for review from the order of
removal that finally concluded his removal proceedings.17 The Ninth
Circuit dismissed Singh’s petition, however, holding that the BIA’s earlier
remand order was the “final order of removal” from which Singh had only
30 days to petition for review.18 As a result, the Ninth Circuit refused to
hear the merits of Singh’s claim.19 Singh’s case depicts the confusion and
conflicts that exist among the circuits due to the lack of a bright-line rule
for finality. The confusion regarding what constitutes the “final order of
removal” for purposes of judicial review often results in noncitizens losing
their ability to challenge the denial of relief from removal.20
Currently, the circuit courts are split on whether courts of appeals
have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s premature appeal. The Second,
Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that circuit courts have
jurisdiction over premature appeals when the subsequent agency action
becomes final.21 On the other hand, the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
held that courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction if the appeal is
premature and that later events cannot cure the defect.22 The inter-circuit
15

Carlson, supra note 7, at 636 (“When that occurs, some forms of relief might be
granted, while others are denied or require a remand to the immigration judge for further
proceedings. This hybrid ‘mixed’ decision often leaves aliens and attorneys wondering
when the removal order becomes final, and thus when they should file a petition for review.
When the Board issues its decision? Or at the conclusion of the remanded proceedings?
Which order constitutes the ‘final order of removal’ for purposes of judicial review?”).
16 Singh v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 880, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2016).
17 Id. at 882.
18 Id. at 883.
19 Id.
20 Over 40% of noncitizens are not represented by counsel during removal
proceedings. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY
2015 Statistics Yearbook (April 2016).
21 See Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
premature petition for review “can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication
of remaining applications for relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has
not shown prejudice”); Mohammed Shuaib Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d
488, 494 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that if the “Attorney General has not shown that he will
suffer prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature
petition for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales v.
United States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the
noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that the noncitizen “did
not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”).
22 See Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d
223 (6th Cir. 2007).
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conflicts regarding the issue of finality, and under what circumstances a
Board decision may be deemed final for purposes of judicial review breed
confusion; a petition for review that is deemed timely in one circuit may
be considered premature or untimely in a different circuit.
Consequently, noncitizens will lose their opportunity to seek judicial
review of the agency’s disposition of their claims.23 The ambiguity as to
when a petition for review should be filed results in noncitizens filing too
late or too early, thereby risking the dismissal of their petitions. For
instance, noncitizens who file multiple petitions to avoid removal may find
those petitions dismissed as premature if the agency has yet to issue a final
decision. Conversely, if the petition for review is late because the
noncitizen missed the mandatory filing deadline, he has lost his ability to
seek judicial review of the agency decision and will be removed from the
United States. This result is unfair to noncitizens, who are often not
represented by counsel, especially where the late filing is due to
contradictory circuit court precedent on finality rather than a mistake on
the part of the noncitizen. Furthermore, this uncertainty can result in the
inefficient and unjust operation of immigration law by stalling judicial
review by the appropriate court of appeals.
This Comment seeks to clarify the circuit split regarding judicial
review of premature petitions and address the inconsistencies amongst the
courts of appeals. This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines
the history of appeals and judicial review under the INA. Part II provides
an overview of the current circuit split on the availability of judicial review
for a noncitizen’s premature petition for review. Part III criticizes the
limited availability of judicial review in the immigration context. Lastly,
Part IV proposes an expansion of judicial review in immigration
proceedings to provide noncitizens with due process and a fair opportunity
to be heard by an impartial decision maker. This Comment argues that the
rule applied by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, allowing
a noncitizen’s premature petition for review to ripen into a reviewable
order if there is no prejudice to the adverse party, promotes fairness and
advances principles of due process.24
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
The INA provides that the federal courts of appeals are the “sole and
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal.”25 As such, a
23

Carlson, supra note 7, at 637.
See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d 128, Khan, 691 F.3d 488, and Jimenez-Morales, 821
F.3d 1307.
25 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
24
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noncitizen may seek judicial review of an adverse decision only when the
relevant order becomes final.26
The INA synonymously describes an order of removal in two parts:
(1) an order of the immigration judge or administrative officer that (2)
either concludes deportability or orders deportation.27 The regulation
defines the “order of the immigration judge” as one that “direct[s] the
respondent’s removal from the United States, or the termination of the
proceedings, or other such disposition of the case as may be appropriate.”28
The INA does not clearly define “final order of removal,” and thus
courts construct their own views on whether and when certain immigration
judge or Board decisions become final for purposes of judicial review.
Under the INA, a noncitizen must seek judicial review of the final order
of removal within thirty days, and this filing deadline is mandatory and
jurisdictional.29 A noncitizen who files his petition for review after a
decision is deemed non-final risks having the petition dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. If the noncitizen then fails to file a petition for review
within thirty days of the actual final agency order, his petition will be
deemed late and he will be barred from bringing an appeal.30 Additionally,
if the “premature” petition is adjudicated at the expiration of the thirty
days, the noncitizen will also be left with no recourse. Noncitizens are
often unable to gain access to judicial review because of the confusion
regarding the existence of a final order of removal and the rigid filing
deadline for appeals.
A. Appeal Procedure
Initially, a Notice to Appear is filed in the immigration court
charging the noncitizen with a violation of law.31 Thereafter, various
hearings are scheduled before the immigration judge and the noncitizen
has the opportunity to contest the charges and pursue appropriate forms of
relief under the INA.32 At the conclusion of the hearings, the immigration
judge will issue a decision.33 The parties may then file an administrative
appeal with the Board within thirty days of the immigration judge’s
26

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).
28 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12.
29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30
days after the date of the final order of removal.”); Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190,
1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The provision establishing the thirty-day filing period is mandatory
and jurisdictional.”) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)).
30 Id.
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).
32 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a).
33 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37.
27
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decision.34 As a last resort, a noncitizen may seek judicial review of the
Board’s final order in the federal court of appeals.35
The general grant of appellate jurisdiction found in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1) establishes “judicial review of a final order of removal.”36
An order of removal becomes final when the Board affirms the
immigration judge’s finding of removability or when the time for
appealing the immigration judge’s decision has expired.37 Circuit courts
“may review a final order of removal only if the [noncitizen] has exhausted
all administrative remedies.”38 However, the statute divests the courts of
jurisdiction over claims by noncitizens with criminal convictions.39
Additionally, under the INA, the Attorney General may use his discretion
in granting various forms of relief from removal; the denial of such
discretionary relief is not subject to judicial review.40
If the petition for review overcomes the procedural barriers, the
federal court of appeals reviewing the case will base its decision on the
merits of the petition for review solely on the administrative record.41 The
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless a “reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”42
B. Meaning of “Finality” in the INA
Finality dictates whether or when a noncitizen may seek judicial
review of agency action under the relevant provisions of the INA. The
INA contains only indirect references to the finality requirement;43
34

8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.38(a)-(b).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(A).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
37 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
38 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if (1) the
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”).
39 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a
criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) [8 USCS
§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)], or any offense covered by section
237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] for which both predicate offenses are,
without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)
[8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)].”).
40 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
41 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
42 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
43 Section 242(a)(1) of the INA provides that “judicial review of a final order of
removal . . . is governed only by chapter 158 of Title 28, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section and except that the court may not order the taking of additional evidence
under section 2347 of such title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); see 8 U.S.C. §§1252(a)-(g)
(providing, with limited exceptions, that a petition for review in the courts of appeals is the
sole and exclusive means for judicial review of a final order of removal). In turn, chapter
158 of Title 28, which relates to judicial review of federal agency orders, more expressly
35
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however, its provisions authorizing judicial review of orders of removal
have universally been understood to contain a finality requirement for
federal court jurisdiction.44 In part, this is because administrative law
recognizes a strong presumption “that judicial review will be available
only when agency action becomes final.”45
The INA requires that an agency order be “final” for judicial review
to be available, however, it does not define or state when an order of
removal becomes final. 46 Such ambiguity has resulted in uncertainty as
alludes to the finality requirement. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2344; see also 28 U.S.C. §§2342,
2349 (stating that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review “final orders” of the
relevant agencies and providing that the filing of a petition for review “does not itself stay
or suspend the operation of the order of the agency”). In addition to the section authorizing
judicial review, the INA refers to final orders of removal in other sections as well, using
finality to describe a condition or serve as a reference point. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§§1182(a)(6)(F), 1182(d)(3)(B), 1227(d)(1), 1228(b)(4)(F), 1229a(b)(7), 1229a(c)(6)-(7),
1231(a)(1), 1253(a)(1). The implementing regulations similarly refer to final and finality
throughout their provisions. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§1.2, 210.4, 214.11(d)(9), 214.14(c)(1)(ii),
216.5(a)(2), 236.1(c)(1), 236.8(a)(4), 245a.12(b)(3), 245a.13(f), 245a.18(c)(1),
245.20(a)(1), (e), 274a.12(c)(18), 1001.1(p), 1003.23(b), 1208.18(b)(2), 1241.1, 1241.31.
44 See, e.g., Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
petition for review because “the BIA’s granting of the motion to reopen means there is no
longer a final decision to review.”); Gafurova v. Holder, 448 F. App’x 139, 140 (2d Cir.
2011) (“The BIA granted [the noncitizen’s] motion to reopen and remanded her case to an
immigration judge for further proceedings and entry of a new decision. Accordingly, there
is no longer a final order of removal against her over which [the court] may exercise
jurisdiction, and [the court] dismiss[es] the petition for review.”); Satheeskumar v. United
States Att’y Gen., 557 F. App’x 128, 130 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[The order of removal] was
rendered non-final when the BIA granted [the noncitizen’s] motion to reopen.”); SanchezNaranjo v. Holder, 510 F. App’x 759, 760 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen, as here, the BIA
reopens a previously concluded removal proceeding and remands for a new decision by the
immigration judge, the prerequisite for circuit court jurisdiction ceases to exist and any
pending petition for review must be dismissed.”); Suharti v. United States Att’y Gen., 349
F. App’x 443, 450 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Absent language explicitly upholding a final order of
removal, the BIA’s sua sponte reopening of proceedings removes the finality of the
removal order and [the court’s] jurisdiction to review it.”); see also Castaneda-Castillo v.
Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 360 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the Board’s reopening of the case
“would have meant that there would be no final agency determination for [the court] to
review, and so [the court] would no longer have had jurisdiction over the case”).
45 Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983). In the administrative context, even if
the relevant statute does not expressly require a “final order” for judicial review, the
Supreme Court has stated that there is a “strong presumption . . . that judicial review will
be available only when agency action becomes final.” Id.; see McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969) (referring to exhaustion principles to explain necessity of
finality rule); Charles Alan Wright et al., 16 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3942 (3d ed.
2012) (discussing the requirement and reasons for finality in federal court review of
administrative decisions).
46 “The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the
final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). This filing requirement is “indeed
jurisdictional in nature,” Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2008), and
thus courts have “no authority to create equitable exceptions” to the thirty-day filing
deadline, Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
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to when a petition for review may be filed and ultimately the loss of the
noncitizen’s opportunity for judicial review.47
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the lingering
question of whether premature petitions for review may ripen into
petitions over which the courts of appeals have jurisdiction, the circuit
courts have decided the question. The circuit courts are split on whether
and when certain orders become final for purposes of judicial review. This
Section will review how the courts of appeals have considered the issue of
whether a premature petition for review may “ripen” into a timely petition
for review once the agency has concluded all relevant administrative
proceedings. Under one approach, if a petition for review is late, the
noncitizen has lost his ability to seek judicial review because the filing
deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional, and, thus, not susceptible to
tolling or any other equitable exception.48 On the other hand, if the petition
for review is premature (i.e., the noncitizen has filed the petition prior to
the agency’s order obtaining the requisite degree of finality for review
purposes), there is a possibility that a circuit court will hold that the
petition ripens upon the completion of all agency proceedings, negating
any need to file a second, timely petition for review.49
The courts of appeals are divided as to whether, and under what
circumstances, they have jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s premature
appeal. The Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that circuit
courts have jurisdiction over premature appeals when the
subsequent agency action becomes final.50 The Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
47

See Batubara v. Holder, 733 F.3d 1040, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2013) (dismissing
petition for review because the petitioner, who waited until administrative proceedings
were completed, failed to file a timely petition for review of the Board’s order remanding
the case to the immigration judge for further proceedings).
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30
days after the date of the final order of removal.”); Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190,
1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The provision establishing the thirty-day filing period is mandatory
and jurisdictional.”) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)).
49 See Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010); Mohammed Shuaib
Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012); Jimenez-Morales v. United
States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016).
50 See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (holding that a premature petition for review
“can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication of remaining applications for
relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice”); Khan,
691 F.3d at 494 (holding that if “the Attorney General has not shown that he will suffer
prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature petition
for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at
1308 (holding that the noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that
the noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”).
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Circuits held that circuit courts do not have jurisdiction if the appeal is
premature and that later events cannot cure the defect.51
A. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May Ripen for
Purposes of Judicial Review
i. Second Circuit
In Herrera-Molina v. Holder, decided in 2010, the noncitizen sought
review of a “decision of the United States Department of Homeland
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement reinstating a prior order
of deportation for illegal entry, entered in July 1985” against the
noncitizen.52 Mr. Herrera-Molina, a citizen of Colombia, illegally entered
the United States in 1972 and was deported in 1985.53 Thereafter, Mr.
Herrera-Molina reentered the United States without inspection and started
a family.54 In 1995, Mr. Herrera-Molina’s spouse became a naturalized
United States citizen, and in 1997, she “filed on behalf of Mr. HerreraMolina a Petition for Alien Relative (“Form I-130”) and an Application to
Adjust Status (“Form I-485”).”55 In 2003, Mr. Herrera-Molina “filed an
Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United
States after Deportation or Removal (“Form I-212”), which was denied.”56
Thereafter, in 2007, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
reinstated his prior order of deportation and placed him in custody.57
After Mr. Herrera-Molina indicated that he feared for his life, an
asylum officer interviewed him and issued a Reasonable Fear
Determination, finding that “he had a reasonable fear of returning to
Colombia” and that he should be allowed to pursue his “withholding of
removal claim before an immigration judge.”58 Mr. Herrera-Molina was
then “placed in withholding of removal proceedings before an
immigration judge, and on November 8, 2007, the immigration judge
denied his application for withholding of removal.”59 Mr. Herrera-Molina
“appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA” and in July 2009,

51 See Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d
223 (6th Cir. 2007).
52 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d 128, 130.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 131.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 130.
58 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 131.
59 Id.
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the BIA dismissed the appeal.60 Subsequently, Mr. Herrera-Molina filed
a petition for review with the Second Circuit.61
The Second Circuit began its analysis by determining whether it had
jurisdiction over the case because, “at the time that the parties filed their
briefs,” Mr. Herrera-Molina’s appeal of the immigration judge’s initial
“denial of withholding of removal was still pending before the BIA.”62
However, after the BIA dismissed Mr. Herrera-Molina’s appeal of the
denial of withholding of removal, the Attorney General conceded that the
petition for review ripened from a premature petition into a petition for
review of a final order of removal.63
The court held that “a premature petition for review of a not-yet-final
order of removal can become a reviewable final order upon the
adjudication of remaining applications for relief and protection, provided
that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice.”64 The court found
that when the BIA rendered a decision resolving Mr. Herrera-Molina’s
appeal and the Attorney General did not claim that he was prejudiced by
Mr. Herrera-Molina “filing a petition for review prior to the BIA’s
decision,” the noncitizen’s petition became reviewable.65
ii. Third Circuit
In Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., decided in 2012, the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal
proceedings after the petitioners, a father and his son, overstayed their
visas.66 The petitioners sought asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),67 alleging that
the father had been “persecuted in Pakistan based on his membership in
60

Id.
Id.
62 Id. at 132.
63 Id.
64 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (citing Lewis v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 128–29
(2d Cir. 2007)); Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Despite his premature
petition to us, we exercised jurisdiction noting that the BIA has since affirmed petitioner’s
removal order and the respondent has not shown prejudice.”).
65 Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (“Accordingly, even if Herrera-Molina’s initial
petition were premature, we conclude that the reinstatement of his prior deportation order
is now a reviewable final order and proceed to the merits of his arguments.”).
66 Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 2012).
67 Article III of the CAT provides that a state may not remove a person to another
nation if there are “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture” in that nation. FARRA § 2242. The United States has signed, ratified,
and codified CAT. “It [is] the policy of the United States not to expel . . . or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .”
FARRA § 2242(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
61
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the Pakistan People’s Party.”68 Before the BIA decided the petitioners’
motion for an emergency stay of removal and a motion to reopen their
case, the petitioners prematurely filed a petition for review with the Third
Circuit “challenging the BIA’s alleged refusal to adjudicate their motion
for an emergency stay of removal and motion to reopen.”69 The Attorney
General moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was “(1)
untimely with respect to the BIA’s February 2003 decision and (2)
premature with respect to the BIA’s anticipated decision on the
petitioners’ motion for an emergency stay of removal and motion to
reopen.”70 The BIA ultimately denied the petitioners’ motion to reopen
because it was untimely and also denied the motion for an emergency stay
of removal.71
The court noted that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of
a motion to reopen unless 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) strips it of jurisdiction.72
The court then looked to other circuits for guidance.73 The Third Circuit
decided it would not dismiss the petition on the basis that it was filed two
weeks prematurely based on the principle that in civil cases the court has
held that “where there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse party and
[the court] has not taken action on the merits of an appeal, a premature
notice of appeal, filed after disposition of some of the claims before a
district court, but before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the
court’s disposal of the remaining claims.”74
The Third Circuit held that “so long as the Attorney General has not
shown that he will suffer prejudice resulting from the premature filing of
a petition for review, and we have yet to take action on the merits of the
appeal, a premature petition for review can ripen once the BIA issues a

68

Khan, 691 F.3d at 491.
Id. at 492.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. (citing Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress has
explicitly granted federal courts the power to review ‘any final order of removal’ under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Implicit in this jurisdictional grant is the authority to review the denial
of a motion to reopen any such final order.”).
73 Khan, 691 F.3d at 492 (“There are differing views among our sister Courts of
Appeals with regard to whether premature petitions for review can ripen upon a final
decision by the BIA. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that
a premature petition for review does not ripen into a timely petition when the final order is
eventually issued. Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 2007); Jaber v.
Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 228–30 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in contrast, has held that a premature petition can ripen provided that the BIA later
orders the petitioner removed and the Attorney General has not shown that he would be
prejudiced. Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).”).
74 Khan, 691 F.3d at 493 (internal citations omitted).
69
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final order on a motion to reopen.”75 The Third Circuit ultimately refused
to treat premature petitions for review from final orders of removal
differently from the way in which it has treated premature notices of
appeal in other cases.76
iii.Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, in the same case where it decided that a final
administrative removal order (“FARO”) is reviewable when issued,77
concluded that it could review the noncitizen’s petition for review of the
administrative removal order because reasonable fear proceedings were
concluded during the pendency of the noncitizen’s petition and the
government has shown no prejudice.78
iv. Eleventh Circuit
Like the Second and Third Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit faced a
situation in which the petitioner filed a petition for review with the court
of appeals before his immigration proceedings had concluded.79 After he
was removed to Colombia, Mr. Jimenez-Morales “unsuccessfully tried to
re-enter the United States without authorization near Hidalgo, Texas.”80
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took Mr. JimenezMorales into custody and “administratively reinstated his 2011 order of
removal.”81 Mr. Jimenez-Morales was placed in a reasonable fear
proceeding after expressing “concern that he would be harmed if returned
to Colombia.”82 Before oral argument, an asylum officer found that the
noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if he
75

Khan, 691 F.3d at 494.
Id.
77 See G.S. v. Holder, 373 F. App’x 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2010) (“a FARO is not
appealable to the BIA—review lies only with the courts of appeals. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(b)(3) (‘The Attorney General may not execute [a FARO] until 14 calendar days
have passed from the date that such order was issued, unless waived by the alien, in order
that the alien has an opportunity to apply for judicial review under section 1252 of this
title.’); id. § 1252(a)(1), (a)(5) (final orders of removal are appealable to courts of
appeals).”).
78 G.S., 373 F. App’x at 843 (as the final administrative removal order was itself
“final,” and there being no express prohibition against the ripening of a premature petition
for review, “a petition for review filed after a FARO has issued but before an alien has
completed the reasonable-fear process ripens upon completion of that process, provided
the government has shown no prejudice arising from the timing of the petition.”).
79 Jimenez-Morales v. United States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. A reasonable fear proceeding is available if in the course of the administrative
removal or reinstatement process, the noncitizen expresses fear of returning to the country
of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 208.31(a).
76
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were removed to Colombia,” and an “immigration judge ratified the
asylum officer’s finding.”83
The Eleventh Circuit first considered whether it had jurisdiction over
the noncitizen’s petition because the DHS’s reinstatement of the 2011
order of removal was not “final” since the reasonable fear proceeding was
ongoing.84 The court noted that the noncitizen’s premature appeal
“presents a jurisdictional problem because the Immigration and
Nationality Act vests circuit courts with jurisdiction to review only ‘final’
orders of removal.”85 The court agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
that, “where a noncitizen pursues a reasonable fear proceeding following
DHS’s initial reinstatement of a prior order of removal, the reinstated
removal order does not become final until the reasonable fear proceeding
is completed.”86 Thus, the court held it did not have jurisdiction when Mr.
Jimenez-Morales filed his petition for review.87
Nonetheless, the court went on to consider whether the petition
ripened when the “immigration judge found that Mr. Jimenez-Morales did
not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, had no basis for
withholding of removal, and could not obtain relief under the CAT.”88 The
court held that the petition for review ripened at the conclusion of the
reasonable fear proceeding and that the court had jurisdiction to review
it.89 The court sided with the Second and Third Circuits because “their
approach is consistent with how we have addressed premature appeals in
other contexts.”90 The court reasoned that this case is similar to cases
where a premature notice of appeal is filed from an order dismissing a
claim or party, and in those cases the premature notice of appeal is valid if
followed by a subsequent final judgment.91 Therefore, the court concluded
that it had jurisdiction to consider the noncitizen’s petition.92
In conclusion, the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have
jurisdiction over premature petitions for review upon the adjudication of
83 Id. at 1307–08 (“The immigration judge found that Mr. Jimenez-Morales did not
have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, that he had no basis for withholding of
removal, and that he could not obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1), no further administrative appeal was
available to Mr. Jimenez-Morales from the immigration judge’s decision.”).
84 Id. at 1308.
85 Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1308. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
86 Id. at 1308.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1309 (stating that a premature notice of appeal is valid if it is filed from an
order dismissing a claim or party, and is followed by a subsequent final judgment, even
without a new notice of appeal being filed) (internal citations omitted).
91 Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1309.
92 Id.
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the remaining applications for relief and protection, provided that the
Attorney General has not shown prejudice.
B. Circuits Where a Premature Petition for Review May Not Ripen for
Judicial Review
The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a premature
petition for review may not ripen into a properly filed petition based on
the principle that finality is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.93
i. Fifth Circuit
In Moreira v. Mukasey, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
filed a Notice to Appeal, alleging that Mr. Moreira was “subject to removal
under § 1227 because he had been convicted of two crimes involving
moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal
misconduct.”94 The immigration judge ordered removal, rejecting Mr.
Moreira’s “contention that his offenses failed to qualify as crimes of moral
turpitude.”95 Mr. Moreira “filed a timely pro se notice of appeal to the
BIA,” and “the BIA affirmed the decision of the immigration judge and
dismissed Mr. Moreira’s appeal.”96 Mr. Moreira then “filed a motion for
reconsideration and to reopen the BIA’s decision dismissing his appeal of
the immigration judge’s order.”97 However, the BIA denied this motion.98
Mr. Moreira then “filed a second motion to reopen and reconsider,” which
the BIA also denied.99 “While his appeal to the BIA was pending,” Mr.
Moreira “filed a habeas corpus petition in the District of Connecticut.”100
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether it had “jurisdiction to consider
Mr. Moreira’s challenges to the immigration judge’s order of removal and
the BIA’s affirmance of that order.”101 The court noted that “the passage
of the REAL ID Act divested district courts of jurisdiction over removal
orders and designated the courts of appeals as the sole forums for such
challenges via petitions for review.”102 The government argued that the
93 Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709, 713–14 (5th Cir. 2007); see Jaber v. Gonzales,
486 F.3d 223, 228–30 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a case where review was sought from
the immigration judge’s decision, but no petition for review was filed after the Board
finally disposed of the case); Brion v. INS, 51 F. App’x 732, 733 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777, 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1989)).
94 Moreira, 509 F.3d at 711.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Moreira, 509 F.3d at 711.
101 Id. at 712.
102 Id.
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court lacked jurisdiction because “Mr. Moreira’s appeal of the
immigration judge’s removal order was pending at the time he filed his
habeas petition.103 The government also argued that the noncitizen’s
petition should be dismissed because he “had not exhausted his
administrative remedies as required by § 1252(d)(1).”104
The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Moreira’s
petition.105 With regard to the noncitizen’s challenge of the immigration
judge’s order of removal, the court lacked “jurisdiction to review the
immigration judge’s decision independently.”106 The court found that “at
the time that Mr. Moreira filed his petition for review, there was no final
order that would permit it to review the order of deportation.”107 The Fifth
Circuit followed the approaches taken by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in
holding that “because there was no final order of removal to review, the
court lacked jurisdiction at the time Mr. Moreira’s petition was filed” and
that the “BIA’s later dismissal of Mr. Moreira’s appeal could not cure this
jurisdictional defect.”108
ii. Sixth Circuit
In Jaber v. Gonzales, the petitioner “entered the United States on an
immigrant visa as the spouse of a United States citizen with the status of a
conditional permanent resident.”109 After the marriage was annulled, “the
Immigration and Naturalization Service served Mr. Jaber with notice that
it intended to terminate his conditional permanent resident status” on the
basis of this annulment.110 Mr. Jaber responded by filing a petition
requesting “a waiver of the requirement that he and his wife file a joint
petition for permanent residence.”111 Thereafter, Mr. Jaber married
another U.S. citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative (“Form I-130”)
so that he could apply for a visa.112 Mr. Jaber “filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court” while his appeal to the BIA was
pending.113
The Sixth Circuit held it did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Jaber’s
petition; although he “sought BIA review of the immigration judge’s
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Moreira, 509 F.3d. at 713.
Id..
Id. at 713–14.
Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
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denial of his motions to reopen,” “the BIA did not issue its decision until
after Mr. Jaber filed his habeas petition in the district court and after the
district court transferred the case” to the Sixth Circuit.114 The court relied
on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), holding that “a party must file a petition for
review with the court of appeals within 30 days.”115
iii.Ninth Circuit
In Abdisalan v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit held in its unanimous en
banc opinion that when the Board issues a decision that denies relief in
part, but remands other claims to an immigration judge for further
proceedings, the agency decision is not a final reviewable order of removal
and “does not trigger the thirty-day window in which to file a petition for
review.”116
The Ninth Circuit “adopted a straightforward rule: when the BIA
issues a decision that denies some claims but remands any other claims for
relief to an immigration judge for further proceedings (a ‘mixed’ decision),
the BIA decision is not a final order of removal with regard to any of the
claims, and it does not trigger the thirty-day window in which to file a
petition for review.”117 Rather, a noncitizen should only seek judicial
review at the conclusion of the proceedings, after either the immigration
judge has issued a decision and the time for filing an administrative appeal
has passed, or the BIA has issued a final decision after appeal from the
immigration judge’s decision.118 Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction
over any petition for review filed prior to the conclusion of the
proceedings.119
In rendering its decision, the court recognized that the “point at
which a removal order becomes final is critical for the purposes of timely
petitioning for judicial review.”120 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit was
concerned about the injustice that could arise because of the inconsistency
in its jurisprudence regarding “mixed” decisions.121 The court recognized
that “finality is less obvious when the Board affirms the denial of relief on
some of an alien’s claims but remands to the immigration judge for further
proceedings on others in a ‘mixed’ decision.”122

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 229–30.
Jaber, 486 F.3d at 229.
Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Id. at 520.
Id. at 526–27.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Abdisalan, 774 F.3d at 522.
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The court relied on the statutory text to “indicate that an order of
removal cannot become final for any purpose when it depends on the
resolution of further issues by the immigration judge on remand.”123 First,
in defining finality for purposes of judicial review, the court reviewed 8
U.S.C. § 1252, which states that the court has jurisdiction to review “a
final order of removal.”124 The court relied on the definition of “order of
removal” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), where Congress
defined an order of removal as “the order” of the immigration judge
“concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.”125 “The
order [] becomes “final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board
[] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the
alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board.”126
Next, the court examined “the INA’s repeated reference to ‘the’
order” and concluded that those references “suggest that Congress
contemplated that an alien’s removal proceedings would typically
culminate in one final order of removal.”127 Thus, since there is only one
final order of removal, the court found it “difficult to conceive how the
order could become final at multiple points in time.”128 In support of this
reading of the statute, the court relied on the plain meaning of the word
“final,” and its common definition, as well as Congress’s use of the
familiar term to conclude that Congress could not have “intend[ed] for an
order of removal to become final while remanded proceedings remained
ongoing.”129
In conclusion, the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits concluded that a
premature petition for review cannot ripen into a properly filed petition
because the INA provides jurisdiction to review only final orders of
removal, and that finality is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review.
Therefore, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits will not review premature
petitions under any circumstances.
IV. THE INA’S AMBIGUOUS JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS
CREATE CONFUSION
To promote justice, premature petitions for review should ripen into
reviewable orders upon disposal of all claims and absent prejudice to the
government. The lack of access to judicial review of final orders of
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
Abdisalan, 774 F.3d at 523–24.
Id. at 774 F.3d at 524.
Id.
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removal deprives noncitizens of their due process rights and often results
in noncitizens with valid claims being deported to dangerous countries.130
The INA’s obscure language regarding the availability of judicial review
of undefined “final” orders of removal creates confusion. The current
confusion and conflict among the circuits not only wastes judicial
resources, but also serves to deprive noncitizens of judicial review. In
light of the current circuit split, noncitizens will likely receive more
favorable results if their premature petitions are filed in the Second, Third,
Tenth or Eleventh Circuits. In contrast, if the premature petition is filed
in the Fifth, Sixth, or Ninth Circuits, the noncitizen will be left with no
recourse and likely forced to return to his/her country and endure the
hardships and dangerous conditions he/she was fleeing from in the first
place.
The rule applied by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
is the fairer and more efficient rule. Under this standard, absent a showing
of prejudice to the adverse party, a noncitizen’s premature petition for
review will ripen into a reviewable order upon disposal of all claims.131
This rule promotes fairness and advances principles of due process as it
provides noncitizens with the opportunity to have their case heard by an
impartial decision maker. Furthermore, it allows the agency to complete
its proceedings without premature interference from the courts and
provides noncitizens with essential, clear guidance about the proper time
in which to file a petition for review. Indeed, orders of removal require
strict judicial review as the result of such an order will drastically impact
the welfare and future of the noncitizen and his family.
The INA’s judicial review provisions leave the critical detail of
“finality” undefined. Such inadequacy ultimately has resulted in
uncertainty as to when a petition for review may be filed, and in some
unfortunate cases, the loss of the noncitizen’s opportunity for judicial
review. It is well established that constitutional protections extend to
noncitizens within the United States’ geographic borders.132 Pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment, no person—including noncitizens—shall be
130 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543, 546 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893))
(Noncitizens are “persons” entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.).
131 See Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1308–09; Khan, 691 F.3d at 493; HerreraMolina, 597 F.3d at 132.
132 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to
[noncitizens] outside of our geographic borders . . . but once a [noncitizen] enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’
within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
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deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”133 As
such, noncitizens, like United States citizens, are entitled to have their
orders of removal reviewed by an impartial decision maker. Because
noncitizens are not versed with the laws of the United States or judicial
procedure, the courts of appeals must adopt a uniform standard that
outlines the requirements for review of petitions to soothe the confusion
and promote the due process rights and liberties detailed in the
Constitution.
Critics of judicial review in immigration cases believe that judicial
review is a tactic to delay deportation.134 However, this criticism ignores
the fact that some delays are necessary to preserve the values of our
constitution and to correct injustice done at the administrative level.
Proponents of judicial review have argued that “judicial review is a key to
success for improvement of the immigration adjudication system” because
it ”helps to boost immigration esteem,” “is essential to a more efficient
system,” and “increases the legitimacy of the entire adjudication
system.”135 Strict judicial review is essential in immigration cases because
the stakes are high for vulnerable noncitizens and the federal courts of
appeals are in a superior position to simplify immigration law and set
precedent which allows noncitizens every opportunity to have their case
heard by an impartial decision maker. Indeed, federal judges have
critiqued immigration court decisions because of the lack of quality and,
at times, injustice.136 The importance of judicial review is amplified in the
context of removal hearings due to the highly punitive nature of
deportation. Certainly, a clear standard of judicial review promotes justice
and provides that judiciary resources are efficiently used in cases where
all administrative remedies have been exhausted.
V. PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION
The rule adopted by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
which permits the courts of appeals to review premature petitions absent a
showing of prejudice to the adverse party safeguards the interests of
noncitizens and is the most efficient rule. This rule avoids unnecessary
piecemeal litigation, allows the agency to complete its proceedings
without premature interference from the courts, and provides noncitizens
with clear guidance about the proper time to file a petition for review.
133

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The
Certificate of Reviewability, 8 Nev. L.J. 499, 521–22 (2008).
135 Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration
Adjudication Crisis, 59 Kan. L. Rev. 541, 584.
136 Id. at 570.
134
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Additionally, a universal interpretation of the INA provisions would
preserve a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial review of final
orders of removal. Judicial review is essential in cases involving final
orders of removal because of the punitive nature of removal from the
United States. For noncitizens in removal proceedings, the stakes could
hardly be higher. Noncitizens face the prospect of being forced from the
country they call home—leaving behind friends, family, and loved ones—
and being deported to a country where they may fear imprisonment,
torture, and even death.137
Because noncitizens are required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to seeking judicial review, it is imperative that the courts adopt a
universal interpretation of the INA language regarding the finality of an
order of removal to safeguard the interests of noncitizens and the judiciary.
It is well established that “the presence of a final agency action is
important in order to, inter alia, ‘provide[] the agency with every
reasonable opportunity to resolve the matter by using its special
expertise.’”138 As such, the INA provisions must detail when the agency
action is complete so that there is guidance as to when noncitizens may
seek federal judicial review of an order of removal.
One proposal is for the courts of appeal to adopt a bright-line rule
dictating when judicial review could be sought. “A bright-line rule
ensures that noncitizens are on clear notice of when they must file their
petition for review, thus guarding against a missed filing deadline.”139 A
uniform interpretation of “final order of removal” will minimize costs
associated with seeking judicial review and ensure that judicial review is
only used when the agency has finally decided all issues.140 Certainly, the
circuit court’s immigration docket will be reduced if there is a universal
rule that specifies when an order is “final” so that a noncitizen may seek
judicial review. Such a rule will ease the burden on the courts of appeals
137 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (deportation is a “drastic
measure” with “harsh consequences”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154
(1945) (“[D]eportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth living.’”) (citing
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
138 Administrative Abstention, 67 Ala. L. Rev. 1019, 1058 (citing William A. McGrath,
et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 571,
685–86 (1991).
139 Carlson, supra note 7, at 687.
140 Charles Alan Wright, et al., 16 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3942 (3d ed. 2012)
(discussing the requirement and reasons for finality in federal court review of
administrative decisions). The general policy reasons behind the finality requirement often
converge with the reasons for requiring exhaustion. Id. Thus, while one does not equal the
other, the justifications for exhaustion, e.g., concepts such as judicial efficiency and
administrative primacy often explain or elucidate the purpose of the finality requirement.
Id. Notably, some have suggested that finality and the ripeness doctrine completely overlap
and that the former may be substituted by the latter. Id.
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dockets because noncitizens will be on clear notice as to when to file a
petition for review, thus eliminating the need for the courts to evaluate
petitions which have not matured for purposes of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court can step in and resolve the circuit split by
interpreting the INA provisions dealing with final orders of removal. The
Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning of the Second, Third, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits which allow the courts of appeals to review
premature petitions absent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party.
This interpretation clarifies when a noncitizen should file a petition for
review and safeguards the constitutional rights of noncitizens. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has held that practical, not technical,
considerations are to govern the application of principles of finality.141
The standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
not only provides clarity, but it is fair and efficient.142 Under this
approach, the courts participate in a burden-benefit analysis in considering
premature petitions.143 Under this standard, if there is no showing of
prejudice by the Attorney General and the court has not acted on the merits
of an appeal, a premature notice of appeal will ripen into a reviewable
order upon the immigration court’s disposal of the remaining claims.144
Thus, the standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits effectively preserves the rights of noncitizens to seek judicial
review. This impartial interpretation of the INA is necessary to protect the
rights of noncitizens who are already vulnerable and intimidated by the
lengthy and uncertain process to obtain lawful status and avoid removal.
Congress could, as well, step in and resolve the problem by enacting
a clear definition of what constitutes a final order of removal for purposes
of judicial review. In accordance with the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits, Congress can enact a universal rule that “finality, for
purposes of judicial review, does not exist so long as any determination of
removability or application for relief remains to be decided by the
agency.”145 The addition of a finality definition into 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
which governs judicial review of orders of removal, provides the benefit
141

Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1949).
See Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 132 (holding that a premature petition for review
“can become a reviewable final order upon the adjudication of remaining applications for
relief and protection, provided that the Attorney General has not shown prejudice”); Khan,
691 F.3d at 494 (holding that if “the Attorney General has not shown that he will suffer
prejudice resulting from the premature filing of a petition for review,” “a premature petition
for review can ripen once the BIA issues a final order”); Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at
1308 (holding that the noncitizen’s petition ripened when the immigration judge found that
the noncitizen “did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture”).
143 Id.
144 See Khan, 691 F.3d at 494.
145 Carlson, supra note 7, at 685.
142
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of clarity and eases the noncitizen’s burden of applying for judicial
review.146 The following language, proposed by Jesi J. Carlson, Patrick J.
Glen and Kohsei Ugumori naturally fits into 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and
clearly provides that judicial review would be premature until all agency
proceedings are completed:
(2) Finality
(A) An order of removal entered under 8 U.S.C.§§1228, 1229a, and
1231(a)(5), is not final for purposes of judicial review unless (i)
removability has been finally determined and (ii) all applications for relief
and protection and other administrative matters, including but not limited
to asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, adjustment of
status, voluntary departure, background checks, and designation of
country of removal, have been resolved by the Board, an immigration
judge, or other immigration official charged with resolving such
application or matter.
(B) The filing of any applications for relief or protection from
removal following entry of the final order of removal shall not affect the
finality of such order.
(C) An order denying reopening or reconsideration becomes a final
order of removal upon entry of the order by the Board or, if denied by the
immigration judge, when such order becomes final pursuant to
regulation.147
The proposed language allows the agency to complete its
proceedings without premature interference from the courts and provides
noncitizens with clear guidance about the proper time to file a petition for
review. A universal interpretation or rule that an order of removal is not
“final” until all administrative proceedings have concluded, irrespective
of remands or voluntary departures is supported by the statutory and
regulatory language and administrative precedent. This universal rule
would also preserve a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial
review of final orders of removal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The vagueness in the Immigration and Nationality Act judicial
review provisions has left many noncitizens without any recourse from
removal orders. Many noncitizens are deported to countries full of
violence and turmoil because of the INA’s lack of clarity as to when an
order of removal is final for purposes of judicial review.148 This confusion
146

Id.
Id. at 684.
148 In 2015, a total of 333,341 noncitizens were removed compared to 407,075 in 2014.
See Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2015)
147
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is evidenced in the diverging circuit decisions regarding premature
petitions for review.149 The time is ripe for the courts of appeals to adopt
a uniform standard of review for premature petitions for review to resolve
the confusion and promote the due process rights and liberties detailed in
the Constitution.
The standard followed by the Second, Third, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits preserves a fair opportunity for noncitizens to seek judicial review
of final orders of removal and provides clarity as to when judicial review
is available. It is also the fairest and most efficient rule. Under this
standard, if there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse party and the
court of appeals has not acted on the merits of an appeal, a premature
notice of appeal will ripen into a reviewable order upon the BIA or
immigration court’s disposal of the remaining claims.150 This rule
guarantees that noncitizens are on clear notice of when they must file their
petition for review and preserves the resources of the judiciary so that
judicial review is only used when the agency has finally decided all issues.
Lastly, a uniform rule advances the values detailed in the United States
Constitution.

https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/table39, accessed on Oct. 23,
2017.
149 See Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010); Mohammed Shuaib
Khan v. United States Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012); Jimenez-Morales v. United
States Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016); Moreira v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 709 (5th
Cir. 2007); Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007); Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d
517 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
150 See Khan, 691 F.3d at 494.

